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Abstract:  
The purpose of this article is to overturn some key assumptions on the nature 
of populism in relation to culture and policy. Populism is often defined in terms 
of a Right-wing appeal to mass culture and uneducated taste, unmediated by 
political institutions and the reflexive historical discourse of modernity. While 
the subject of culture and populism is huge, and cannot be fully broached 
here, this article takes a period of unique policy innovation — New Labour's 
first terms in government in the UK. It assesses the way culture and policy 
were articulated and positioned between urban and social policies, creating 
the conditions for a form of "social instrumentalism" that was as irresistible to 
the Left as it was acceptable to the Right. This article assesses the apparent 
paradoxes of social instrumentalism and its implications with regard culture, 
democracy and the political function of public policies. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The purpose of this article is to identify social instrumentalism as a significant 
dimension of Left populism. What is commonly identified as "instrumentalism" 
in policies for the arts or cultural sector, is not, I argue, simply an 
epiphenomenon of a putative global neoliberal order (which emerged after 
Reaganomics, Thatcherism and the influence of Hayek and Friedman's 
notions of "free market" in the 1980s: Stedman Jones, 2012). Nor is it simply 
an after-effect of the subsequent Europe-wide public sector reforms of the 
1990s, which demanded that state agencies and local government reconcile 
themselves to new neoliberal realities (reforms influenced by American so-
called New Public Management or "NPM": Clarke and Newman, 2009). 
Rather, this article worked towards understanding a form of instrumentalism 
that cannot be exclusively attributed to the political Right and their attempt to 
introduce putative principles of market competition and enterprise into culture. 
Instrumentalism in cultural policy has often been associated with 
	 2	
commercialisation and mass market appeal — or the introduction of principles 
of exchange, first observed by Adorno and Horkheimer in the early 1940s 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 1973). Instrumentalism, however, is also a strategy 
of the Left — that is to say, a strategic means by which the arts and culture 
can meet the so-perceived social demands of democracy.  
 
A central dilemma of democracy is instrumentalism, or the use of public 
assets for the perceived common good through their employment and 
deployment in public policies. Past public policy trends in "cultural democracy" 
as much as "the democratisation of culture" have suffered from both being 
defined as cultural assets as much as subject to the demands of the common 
public. An investigation into these historical conceptions of culture and their 
consequent requirements, implications for governance, the state and the 
citizen, simply exceeds the parameters of this article; moreover, democracy 
itself, as a form of state management, government, party-system of 
governance and accountability, electoral representation, and so on, is 
historically variable and endlessly mutable – referring to it as a "system" is 
perhaps misleading. Nonetheless, the basic assumption of this article is that 
genuine democracies are never free of populism, still less are "the opposite" 
of populism. Indeed, if populism is predicated on an appeal to a majority, an 
undifferentiated "mass" of “the people”, or indeed a form of political leadership 
dominated by emotion, conviction or "popularity" (where charisma is as much 
an affect of parties as individual leaders), then populism is surely internal to 
democracy. And while parties Right and Left may utilise the political 
dynamism of populism for various or specific ends, a pervasive state of 
populism involves an avoidance of the institutional organisation of democracy 
to the extent that it always threatens to exceed any party or governments' 
ability to manage it (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Judis, 2016; Moffitt, 2016). 
Populism, therefore, while internal to democracy, will always remain a mere 
dimension or component, and of course, is rarely in itself a form of political 
philosophy, still least a type of party.  
 
This article will register how the intellectual development of New Labour's 
public policies for culture evolved during a short period (1997-2004) and 
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facilitated a new form of populism. This is not a "cultural populism" in the Jim 
McGuigan sense (an extension of the critical cultural studies concept of mass 
culture), but of a more generalised form of political populism facilitated by 
cultural policy (McGuigan, 1992). While in one sense New Labour's public 
policies for culture were "radical" in demanding widespread cultural reforms 
that aimed for social benefit, education and cultural opportunities for marginal 
groups, in another sense they continued policy trajectories set in motion by 
previous Conservative regimes. These were for the maintenance of the 
institutions and structures of culture, albeit to play contributory "roles" in 
national economic development. This instrumentalism in itself is not 
significant; what is significant is (a) the dissolution of the radical opposition 
between public and private; (b) the assumption of an equivalence between 
public and State; and (c) an assumption that the mechanisms or infrastructure 
of cultural production have no internal autonomy or political constitution (i.e. 
effectively engender a de-politicisation of culture). New Labour’s appropriation 
of culture appealed to Left and Right voters, and did so through an increasing 
embedding of cultural policies with other central policy agendas (i.e. non-
cultural agendas).  
 
In terms of methodology, this paper combines two approaches, both open-
ended in the sense that this article can only hope to identify critical junctures 
or moments in a broader and historically expansive political discourse. A full 
assessment would, of course, take into account the institutional framings and 
agencies involved, and demonstrate empirically how the apparent variegated, 
incessant and seemingly over-complex policy initiatives of New Labour 
nonetheless served to generate a cohesive ideological discourse. This article 
will therefore proceed by way of a cursory historical discourse analysis, 
articulated as critical historical commentary, and identify not so much a 
coherent ideology (identified as populist) but an ideological strategy (where 
populism is often anti-ideology in its pretentions). Key policy documents, in 
which New Labour’s credibility and political communications were heavily 
invested, reveal a greater policy orientation, set of values and aspirations, and 
this can indicate an ideology as strategy not dogma (Freeden, 1996). This 
article does not account for the policy deliberations, alliances and political 
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machinations that characterised British government during these years, as 
have other recent studies of New Labour (Hewison, 2014; Gray, 2000; 
Hesmondhalgh, Oakley, Lee, Nisbett, 2017), but rather it attempts to identify 
New Labour’s rhetorical assimilation of paradox (as in policy positions that are 
both Left and Right), and so a distinctive social instrumentalism of culture.  
 
Section One: Policy, politics and the historical context 
 
Though the 1970s and 1980s, subjects previously only known to urbanists 
and geographers became the subject of popular public debate — de-
industrialisation, insecurity, urban flight and unequal mobility, social 
polarization and youth delinquency, and importantly, public loss of control 
over local land. A landmark government initiative known as Policy for the 
Inner Cities (1977), and the new legislation of the Inner Urban Areas Act 
(1978) — the "Act" of Parliament being the most powerful regulatory 
mechanism of government — saw for the first time "the city" conceptualised 
as a policy entity, and serious enough to justify state interventionary powers. 
Thomas Hutton is a key scholar who has articulated the key characteristics of 
what may be called the context — the de-industrialisation of the West (Hutton, 
2010): its characteristics are the loss of community cohesion, identity and 
quality of life once secured by enduring "heavy" industry. The "Post-industrial" 
became a subject of some speculation, as factories, docklands, 
manufacturing plants and huge tracts of land once occupied became vacant 
and seemingly obsolete, and as industry declined so did central government 
revenues, public funds, and the powers of the State to re-invest. This 
increasing fiscal weakness of State apparatus, particularly local government, 
offered an opportunity to incoming British Prime Minister Thatcher to 
campaign against State monopoly on planning and infrastructure 
development, and with it, a strategy for re-industrialisation now famously 
associated with the rise of the service-sector economy and the orientation 
towards supply-side consumer-oriented understanding of economic 
production.  
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A central mechanism of re-industrialisation was the emergence of 
"partnerships" or public-private alliances, where the "private" would generate 
the managerial competencies for production and the "public" would ensure 
quality, value for money and public “access” (a phenomenon that was made 
synonymous with the public interest). It is against a backdrop of 
"deindustrialisation-reindustrialisation" that we can effectively understand the 
apparent paradoxes of the politicisation and instrumentalisation of cultural 
policies and the arts.  
 
The two previous stretches of Conservative government were 1957–1964 and 
1970-74, though dates in themselves say relatively little in an era of huge 
complexity. Since the so-called "post-war settlement" of Labour' post-War rule 
(1945-51), a fundamental social contract of welfare provision saw even the 
following Conservative governments retain. Prime Minister Thatcher (1979-
1990) can be understood as opening an era of global neoliberalism, even if 
her own "free market" theories were nationalist and oriented towards small-
scale British businesses and entrepreneurs. While Thatcher's free markets 
required a de-scaling of the State, the governance dimensions of the State 
increased in power (only the social and welfare dimensions shrank). 
Moreover, as governance and business interests coalesced in the "private-
public partnership" nexus, the market became a useful mechanism with which 
to de-politicise growth-oriented economics. 
 
It was "Thatcherism" that established the "private-public partnership" as a 
central principle for public governance (largely for cities: Stoker, 1991), and in 
this dissolution of the Post-war dichotomy of "public-private", the significance 
of what later became urban policy, is seminal. Public-private-driven urban 
development continued after Thatcher (Conservative rule lasted under Prime 
Minister John Major until 1997), and the decade of Labour Party reforms that 
took place during this time, in part, continued the principle into all areas of 
public policy. Indeed, "private-public partnership" was regarded as compatible 
with the European social democracy the "New" Labour Party of the 1990s 
emulated. It was also regarded compatible with the many European Union 
urban policies that Thatcher and Major's government had unwittingly allow to 
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pass into UK law and practice (the EU's adaptation of the principles of The 
Council of Europe's European Campaign for Urban Renaissance, 1982-1986, 
and with it the term "renaissance" as a metaphor for re-industrialisation 
through broad social and cultural enfranchisement). 
 
Thatcher innovated with new public organisations — one of which were the 
Urban Development Corporations (known as QANGO or quasi-autonomous 
non-governmental organisation). The UDCs were a "public-private" operation, 
and the central mechanism of British urban policy, continued in different forms 
by New Labour (Imrie and Thomas, 1999: 11). Set up after the Local 
Government, Planning and Land Act of 1980, where Thatcher limited the role 
of local authorities in planning and development, offered public tenants a 
"Right to Buy" public housing, and introduced the principles of the market into 
the development of public property and assets. The restrictions on public 
authorities borrowing and investing capital, meant they had to turn to private 
corporations and investment funds in order to finance public development. 
Even Far-Left Labour Party-dominated local authorities (in major cities) had 
no choice but to operate in partnership with powerful construction companies, 
design, planning and property development corporations, banks and 
investment funds. Within a decade, the principle of the market became a 
meta-concept, where even public, common or State-owned property was only 
maintained and developed in partnership with market-led private interests, 
who operate within exchange-based contracts with necessary profit-
stakeholder gains. The market as a principle exceeded any previous form of 
commerce or business – as a meta-concept it became a principle equivalent 
to “civil society” and a norm of public administration.  
 
The reason for this compressed historical narrative, is to emphasise how the 
"public-private" principle animating re-industrialisation (whose most visible 
form was urban policy and the physical development of cities), was an 
irresistible framework by which cultural policy for the arts was renegotiated. 
Huge symbolic signifiers of national economic change swiftly became political 
obligation, and few at the time identified the philosophical impact on the post-
War consensus of values. It took a decade, but from the late 1980s, all 
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publicly-funded arts and cultural organisations were feeling the need to 
articulate their positioning within this changing landscape. The market was no 
longer simple a social realm of exchange and commerce – it was a new 
evolving civil society lexicon by which non-State actors were asserting their 
independence and interests and engaging ordinary people (albeit as 
consumers).  
 
In 1989, The Arts Council of Great Britain (as they were then called — in 1994 
they were devolved to each of the four UK nations) published a significant 
policy statement. The statement was brief, but called An Urban Renaissance: 
The Role of the Arts in Urban Regeneration (1989), and introduced the 
concept of a "role" for arts and culture in Britain's fast changing cities. The 
argument internal to the policy statement is explicitly economic – that the arts 
attract tourism, increase employment, provide public amenities and 
community resource and contribute to the building of identity and pride. 
Today, these claims are unremarkable; in 1989 they were common 
observation. Yet, the seemingly innocuous claims that the arts can create "a 
climate of optimism" and a “can do” attitude, was evolving into a more 
invasive series of political obligations to participate in a new “enterprise 
culture” (ACGB, 1989: unpaginated).  
 
Why the arts community did not altogether protest is a matter of the economic 
context. Urban policy, as An Urban Renaissance pointed out, was 
fundamentally concerned with deprivation, poor communities, and the 
repopulation of inner cities (where most cultural institutions were located). 
Whether or not the national political rationale was free-market economics was 
less important than the beneficiaries, who were local people and their 
immediate urban environment. This presented a political paradox that 
animated New Labour's approach to both the arts and urban policy 
(separately), and inherent to the problem of populism. Free market economics 
were, at the time, almost miraculously delivering the UK's recessionary 
national economy and benefiting the populace at large in terms of available 
consumer goods and lowering costs of essential items, and for many, the 
potential for taxation and public funding was rising with these expanding 
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markets. Free market mechanisms were showcasing a range of management, 
marketing and economic development opportunities, which always-cash-
strapped public arts organisations found attractive. The free market displayed 
extraordinary powers in creating equality (money is neutral, consumer 
demand is untied to class, religion or estate) and demands for small 
government went well with a seeming growth in civil society.  
 
During the year An Urban Renaissance was written, economist John 
Myerscough wrote the now seminal, Economic Importance of the Arts in 
Britain (Myerscough, 1988). It not only set a template for the justification of the 
public funding of the arts through the contribution of the arts to the "economy", 
but was explicit in its assumption that the welfare of the arts would be more 
secure by adopting an explicitly economic rationale. This "economy" was not 
simply commerce or retail markets — no one expected the arts to generate 
profit for private shareholders. The economy was the new urban economy of 
the changing city, and the art's economic rationale could make a social impact 
on the city without compromising their core competencies (producing art). And 
one art form that immediately adapted to the new urban economy was Public 
Art. The UK's Department of Environment (DOE), at the time responsible for 
urban policy (in its various forms), had demonstrated significant interest in the 
role of culture in urban development. For example, its Action for Cities 
campaign supported over 300 urban-based cultural projects, the scheme 
foreshadowing what would become, under New Labour, "culture-led 
regeneration". One research project resulted in the significant and detailed Art 
for Architecture – a handbook for commissioning (Petherbridge, 1987).    
 
By the year of An Urban Renaissance (1989), structural changes in the 
"economy" of the arts were emerging. The open space of the "public" realm of 
cities became a new platform for art, artists were trained in collaborating with 
architects, and importantly, were gaining experience in contractual, financial 
and sometimes political negotiation with commissioning local bodies — all 
increasingly operating in a "public-private" capacity. The Department of 
Environment also negotiated a Percent for Art scheme: facilitated by the Arts 
Council through its regional bodies, public capital development projects 
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reserved one percent of the budget for arts commissioning. While never 
mandatory, property developers were increasingly demonstrating that artists 
could be valued members of design and planning teams and that the 
expanding genre of Public art could add capital value to new property — 
particularly public property increasingly subject to the demands of 
monetisation. Attractive civic centers were attractive to rent-paying retailers as 
much as consumers out shopping or walking around (ACGB, 1990). Funding 
for art and artists playing a role in urban development was hugely expanded 
by the establishment of the National Lottery in 1993 and its heritage and arts-
funding arm (ACE, 2002), both Percent for Art and the new public investment 
in urban infrastructure can still be seen in the legacy of Birmingham City 
regeneration (1989—1993) and Coventry’s Phoenix Initiative (1996—2003). A 
further significance of this era is the emergence of arts consultancies, urban 
curators and a new series of management capabilities on the part of artists 
themselves.    
Yet, the huge expansion in the professionalisation, financing and urban 
development roles of artists, curators and consultants, embodied a political 
caveat. This caveat was pointed out by Gordon Hughes in response to 
Myerscough's report of 1988: if the arts are to become subject to the same 
orders of value and quantification of value as other professional services 
(which they would do as one component of urban planning and development), 
they would surely never be able to provide evidence for the extent and validity 
of their contribution (Hughes, 1989). In other words, the question of "cultural 
value" as a function of economic capital, would become a chronic problem. 
Although, beyond Hughes, where the arts were increasingly playing a role in 
more dynamic discourses of transformation and agency, the concept of a 
cultural "value" would probably become irretrievable.  
 
Section Two: Valuing culture 
 
By the end of the 1990s, all artists and organisations in receipt of public funds 
were generally operating according to a project-management logic, and 
routinely obligated to demonstrate business, marketing and administration 
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competencies, along with evidence that they were indeed contributing value to 
the economy (Lovell, 1998; Everitt, 2007). The professional competencies 
required to operate within economic development of any kind radically 
changed how cultural production was managed. Increased 
professionalisation, remuneration, power of position and a seniority of people 
who were not themselves creative, also saw a huge expansion in the arts and 
cultural sectors. The arts and cultural organisations began to attract what, 
since Bourdieu's research of the 1970s, have been called "intermediaries" — 
professionals who facilitate creative production but are not themselves artists 
or creatives (Maguire and Matthews, 2014). The rise of "arts professionals", 
curators and the increasingly strategic funding body executives, dispelled the 
old "sub-culture" ethos of arts communities and the cultural politics of the arts 
(as a realm of ethical life distinct from the State — where the State was 
increasingly co-opting the public realm).   
 
The State co-option of the "public" realm is particularly vivid in New Labour's 
reorganisation of local authorities and the mechanisms of public funding 
distribution. The revitalisation of cities became a central rationale for such 
organisation, and a genuine area of creativity and policy imagination. Even 
the otherwise dull environmental policies became a vehicle for critique and 
new ideas: the national sustainability strategy, A Better Quality of Life (DETR, 
1999a), was used by Prime Minister Tony Blair as a re-statement of the 
party's commitment to social democracy, prefaced with his words: "Success 
has been measured by economic growth – GDP – alone. We have failed to 
see how our economy, our environment and our society are all one. And that 
delivering the best quality of life for us all means more than concentrating 
solely on economic growth [... ] we must ensure that economic growth 
contributes to our quality of life, rather than degrading it’ (DETR, 1999b: 3). 
This was also echoed in the urban White Paper [major policy declaration] -- 
Our Towns and Cities: The Future – Delivering an Urban Renaissance, which 
itself embodied the radical aspirations of architect Richard Rogers (Centre 
Pompidou, etc.), who in 1998 was commissioned to set up a government 
Urban Task Force to offer a new “holistic” template of urban transformation.  
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The final report of the Urban Task Force, Towards an Urban Renaissance 
(1999), had prioritised design, aesthetics and "social well-being" as central 
factors in the economic functionality of cities. While many of the Task Force 
aspirations were ultimately disappointed, the political discourse of 
transformation gained in weight and force, where the new Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister [ODPM] recruited the services of the Commission for 
Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE, established in 1999) and 
generated what was arguably the most inventive stream of strategy and 
guidance documents ever published by any previous government. These 
ranged from public planning to public building, parks and public spaces, 
design and new architecture, public art and commissions for artists, and many 
other areas. Its design thinking is perhaps typified by the guidance booklet By 
Design. Urban Design in the Planning System: Towards a Better Practice 
(intended as a companion guide to the national planning regulations, the 
PPG1's). This booklet  is significant in two respects: (i) Its inspirational graphic 
presentation departed from the dull, regulatory and bureaucratic procedure-
based character of all previous government planning documents; and (ii) its 
tacit critique of urban planning as a realm of public regulation (i.e. restrictions) 
increasingly accommodating the capital interests of physical property 
development; rather, urban planning is defined as "the art of making places 
for people", in other words, as signifiers of identity and a loci of cultural 
habitation. US and Danish traditions of "place making" were in evidence, 
albeit with a political complexion — the appearance of new city plazas or 
"squares" was one such visible expression of the emergence of European 
social democracy.  
 
New Labour's urban policy can be described as a ‘Europeanisation’ of British 
civic life, where the traditional English industrial (Victorian) city was 
deconstructed and reconstructed. As a social class system in architectural 
form, the Victorian city prioritised State institutions, banks and churches, but 
was increasingly modified by pedestrianisation, reassigned building uses, new 
tenants and housing arrangements and a "mixed economy" (of retail, leisure 
and residential) aiming to re-populate the city centers with access for all. This 
re-population was not with the old gentry and their servant-class of workers, 
	 12	
but with a representative spectrum of "multicultural" Britain. As the Arts 
Council's 1993 policy statement, A Creative Future, put it: "The United 
Kingdom is made up not of a single culture, but a multiplicity of cultures [...] it 
is a kaleidoscope, constantly shifting and richly diverse" (ACGB, 1993: 72). 
However, the infinite hybridity presumed by the metaphor of "kaleidoscope" 
did coalesce in socially-specific forms. The "cappuccino culture" of the new 
urban centers of multicultural Britain, was of course, less diverse than the 
political rhetoric that celebrated it. For the millennium year 2000, New Labour 
established a Millennium Commission (1993-2006), which distributed billions 
of pounds by the National Lottery for new cultural centers and urban facilities. 
This was, ostensibly, to mark the Millennium occasion, but was also as a way 
of justifying a fast public-private-driven upgrade of city centers whose neglect 
will be exposed during the planned Millennium mass gatherings and media 
attention.  
 
Urban commentators often focused on these developments, and whose 
pointed observations can be paraphrased as follows (Miles, 2005; Miles and 
Paddison, 2005; Julier, 2005): (i) the economic structure of the new British city 
was no longer governed by need or tangible production, but by leisure and 
services; spaces of production are slowly being eclipsed by spaces of 
consumption, and the arts are increasingly occupying this space; (ii) the 
spectrum of architectural style is not evolving but only adapting a set stylistic 
lexicon of quasi-European postmodernism: its formal vocabulary has little 
place-specific engagement; (iii) the aesthetics of the urban landscape are 
increasingly organised by brand and the symbolic landscape of luxury, visitor 
facilities and signs of ‘gentrification’: cultural organisations are playing a major 
role in this process; (iv) the new "public spaces" of art galleries, festivals and 
cafe restaurants, are economically less accessible to those outside the 
incoming upwardly mobile professional class; and the economy of the new 
city entails a generational displacement of the lower class indigenous 
population, who will not meet rising property values; (v) the policy rhetoric of 
local authority urban planning and development celebrates the locale, 
inclusion and participation, and yet whose flagship facilities position each 
participant as visitor: the "professionalisation" of the city center meant that 
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only employees could consistently play the role of "participants", and that this 
genre of participation was not the social or community phenomenon 
celebrated by the policy rhetoric.  
 
Nonetheless, while the new urban development of an emphatic cultural 
dimension to cities became increasingly subject to academic criticism — the 
criticism remained academic. The New Labour policy rhetoric that increasingly 
framed economic development was that of inclusion and participation, offering 
a sufficient amelioration to the public costs of development. Moreover, the arts 
and cultural sectors were by now populated enough with professionals who 
were increasingly impressed by the changing city, the enfranchisement of 
culture in urban development, city branding, and huge financial investments in 
facilities and visitor numbers — culture had rarely been so valued.  
 
The increasing insertion of the arts and cultural facilities within urban 
development emerged in tandem with another significant phenomenon — the 
rise of the so-called creative industries. While "industries" in design, 
communications, entertainment and media, have always populated London, 
The Creative Industries Mapping Document of 1998 (revised in 2001) was 
extraordinary in its ability to position such industries as a national 
infrastructure. The new government ministry of the Department of Culture 
Media and Sport (a New Labour invention out of the old Department of 
National Heritage, 1992-7) literally invented a new industrial sector, and 
defined that sector in ways that gained recognition and resource within a 
public-private oriented government heavily invested in the power of the 
private, or market. Initially inspired by the Australian Labour government's 
1994 "Creative Nation" strategy, New Labour harnessed a range of high-
profile personnel and generated significant publicity, policy statements and 
brand expressions ("Cool Britannia"), whose impact still resonates around the 
world today (Economist, 1998). A "task force" for the creative industries had 
paralleled the Urban Task Force, and Minister for Culture, Chris Smith, 
immediately published a high-profile book, Creative Britain (Smith, 1998). A 
major newspaper of the time, The Independent, questioned whether Smith 
was more "vital" than Gordon Brown (the Chancellor, or minister of finance) 
	 14	
observing: "Cool Britannia could be a form of post-industrial capitalism that 
combines hard-nosed profits with a fuller recognition of the human creativity 
on which they hinge" (Koenig, 1998). 
 
The significance of the "invention" of the creative industries is twofold: it 
provided an economic framework within which the arts and culture were both 
allocated a role as well as being validated as contributing to a national net 
contributor to the economy; it also collapsed the previous dichotomy between 
art and commerce, business values and the value of culture (whose 
“autonomy” was increasingly regarded as elitist, romantic, institution-based, 
and only for the educated). The brave new world of the creative industries 
was radically egalitarian, with few social hierarchies, and in fact (including pop 
music, fashion and video games) could include a range of hitherto excluded 
social groups (ethnic, gender or simply young people, who were rarely 
included in the echelons of the arts and cultural institutions).  
 
However, while the creative industries generated shifts in the social 
contextualisation of the arts at the level of policy, they were themselves 
symptomatic of a colonising of marginalised areas of social life in the cause of 
re-industrialisation — according to the principle of public-private partnership. 
On the level of policy, where most creative industries were ruthlessly 
commercial (advertising, marketing, art auction houses) and otherwise 
uninvolved in matters of public policy, the policy rhetoric of the creative 
industries represented them as a cohesive realm of public-private value all 
working towards national development strategy aims (where public had 
become private value and private was of public value). The British political 
consensus on "public" and its political opposition to "private" was gradually 
eroded, private and public interests were, rather, mutually enhancing, and so 
the reigning concept of "society" was re-framed as a series of institutions and 
public mechanisms favoring the liberty of the individual and the motivation of 
private interests. In this scenario, the “market” became the only 
transcendental signifier of collective solidarity (albeit a solidarity of individual 
interests). The difference was, where previous civil society consolidations of a 
solidarity of individual interests were, categorically, against State intervention 
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and interference, the State in this case was the safeguard of the public-private 
alliance and guarantor of the benefits of this alliance. On a mass scale, this 
indeed generated an industrious, ever-growing national infrastructure of 
shared interests, albeit where "shared" interests were both (and neither) 
public and private — a vital contradiction that generated vital ideological 
ambiguities. 
 
Thatcher's society was not an Hobbesian "bellum omnium contra omnes" as 
some Left critics argued: it was, rather, a post-Lockean landscape of atomised 
social contracts, made possible by the dynamism and inventiveness of a civil 
society-dominated market. And the market was no longer simply a trading 
space — it was a social expanse in which even artists re-framed their activity 
as a form of exchange mediated by contract-based self-interest. Established 
organisation, brand, legal personality, became essential for any kind of 
agency in this new social landscape.  
 
This was evident from the outset, even as the Creative Industries Task Force 
was mapping the creative industries, the DCMS issues A New Approach to 
Investment in Culture (DCMS. 1998a), after which followed the policy 
statement A New Cultural Framework (DCMS, 1998b). The "new" prefacing 
many policy statements of this time indeed echoed "New" Labour, but more 
importantly, ushered in a new vocabulary by which to define an historic policy 
field — of enterprise, investment, partnership, measurement, and other terms 
that at once disabled the older regimes of management by artist and 
empowered the business manager, albeit a business manager who 
recognised the State as the ultimate executive. For the new economic regime 
was not calibrated to increase the productivity of arts and culture, or even 
make it more commercially viable. New Labour's core constituency remained 
socialist, and the new frameworks framed their call for management 
competencies with a call for civil society autonomy (i.e. increasing 
responsibility for self-management) presided over by an increasingly 
entrepreneurial policy executive. There thus emerged a rapid creation of new 
organisations (for museums, arts, crafts, film, and so on) concurrently with a 
dispersed governance of empowered civil society and a new force for 
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centralisation driven by a quest for monitoring and data gathering. Most vividly 
represented by QUEST (the DCMS Quality, Efficiency and Standards Team, 
or the monitoring ‘watchdog’ as it was referred to (DCMS, 1998b), increased 
detailed compliance procedures for local government and cultural institutions 
were introduced.  
 
The paradox of New Labour's centralisation was that it shifted the axis of 
instability from the realm of producers to the realm of government — and no 
one of New Labour's innovative national cultural management organisations 
amassed any great and lasting power; most have been since dissolved and 
re-constituted (except NESTA, which remains autonomous as an independent 
charitable endowment set up by a 1998 Act of Parliament). What 
centralisation achieved was control without responsibility, or where continued 
funding was always on condition of compliance with a policy executive and its 
monitoring procedures. As policy was always in motion (New Labour’s co-
option of all significant private-public dynamics was a governing “over-reach”, 
and inherently unstable), tracking progress and production became 
symptomatic of an insecurity generated by chronic instability. Inevitably, this 
“tracking” gained an authoritarian dimension whereby the entire arts and 
cultural sector was required to restructure their entire understanding of 
cultural value according to the interests of those outside of the realm of 
cultural production — other policy agendas. While the arts and culture have 
historically always had to satisfy a range of policy demands outside their core 
competencies, New Labour created a political line-management dynamic, for 
monitoring and continual assessment, which began with the Treasury (finance 
ministry), to DCMS, to funding bodies (like Arts Council England) and local 
authorities (such as cities). The lexicon of value and production that ensured 
the cohesion of this line management arrangement, begun with the Treasury. 
It was formalised in 1998 in terms of a "Public Service Agreement" with all 
recipient organisations of public funds (abolished in 2010 by the Coalition 
government on account of the way their powers of diktat subverted actual 
public priorities). 
 
	 17	
Section Three: The social turn 
 
This era, curiously, attracted few if any cultural researchers or political 
scientists who investigation the transformation of public culture, the 
emergence of a strategic ideological force and the reconstruction of national 
cultural value. Values involve a profound experiential dimension (operational 
ethos and lexicon of production, shared understandings of quality, 
acknowledged critical perspectives, and so on), and only those who worked 
through the early years of New Labour are able to articulate the sense of 
political manipulation, reduced sense of autonomy, political homogenisation 
and intellectual conformity, and not least the acceptance of the rise in power 
of institutional managers — who arguably represented political authority and 
demands of policy implementation much more than they did the political 
conditions of cultural.   
Yet, this situation, faced by countless artists, performers, curators and 
administrators, was animated by a vital contradiction: an entire generation of 
arts professionals supported (whether intentionally or not) a growing 
consensus on the nature and role of the State in culture. Where public and 
private value became categorically inseparable, the State becomes the only 
viable arbiter. And where intra-communal arts solidarity was, within a decade, 
replaced by individual competition and careerism, that seemed less important 
than how the arts and cultural sector was in receipt of ever-growing State 
support, of funding and acknowledgement, and a role in the most important 
social policies. Moreover, a trusted Left-wing, not a Right-wing, government 
was creating a command economy of market forces within public space and 
infrastructure, promoting business skills as a means of development and 
capital generating powers. Indeed, the 2001 DCMS landmark policy 
framework, Culture and Creativity: The Next Ten Years, was a trenchant 
promise to both cut public bureaucracy as well as the inappropriate (older, 
commerce-style) market-orientated demands of the previous Conservative 
government. Free market forces were a well of resource to be used, but not to 
which the arts must become enslaved. The priorities were the needs of 
society (children, schools, artists, associations and other public bodies). This 
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framework publication was prefaced by Prime Minister Tony Blair’s foreword, 
in which he stated that above economic value is that the "the arts and 
creativity set us free", reassuringly confirming that "It is in that liberating spirit 
that the arts are part of the core script of this Government’ (DCMS, 2001b:3). 
 
Despite the aspirations of the Arts Council's An Urban Renaissance in 1989, 
little policy headway has been made in framing a strategic arts intervention 
for, specifically, urban policy. Perhaps there was little point, given the rapid 
progress made by the private entrepreneurial realm of public artists and 
consultants, and the large institutions and flagship galleries patronised by city-
based urban regeneration programs. Only in 2004 did DCMS issue a major 
policy statement, albeit as an initiation of a national consultation for the arts 
sector. It was called Culture at the Heart of Regeneration, and its aims were 
telling: Even by 2004, and with many vivid examples of the role of the arts in 
urban development, the political regime was such that its purpose was to 
create "a common way to measure the social, economic and environmental 
impact of [urban cultural] transformational projects" (DCMS, 2004: 3]. Its 
examples of cultural icons and landmarks, place-making and community 
cohesion — along with the urban projects that commissioned and validated 
their work — was not enough. The lack of "measurement" was not merely a 
lack of data to be used in gaining more funds from central government; it was 
a lack of credibility and validation. For in the same year (2004), culture 
minister Tessa Jowell published a personal essay as a policy document 
(under the DCMS imprimatur), expressing quite openly the vital contradiction 
at the heart of New Labour's cultural policies. Called Government and the 
Value of Culture (2004), she argued that culture was an "end in itself" and 
central to human self-actualisation. And yet, "As a Culture Department we still 
have to deliver the utilitarian agenda, and the measures of instrumentality that 
this implies, but we must acknowledge that in supporting culture we are doing 
more than that, and in doing more than that must find ways of expressing it” 
(DCMS/Jowell, 2004e: 9). 
 
The essay was an eloquent and intellectually informed expression of cultural 
value and the role of the arts in society — only to be rendered meaningless by 
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the admission that we "lack convincing language and political arguments". 
The "lack" in this case was, again, not a lack in any substantive sense but a 
discursive disorientation at how policy has become so vacated of any 
reference to cultural production (and experience) nothing we could employ 
from thousands of years of cultural and philosophical history, or the 
increasingly innovative terrain of contemporary practice, could count.  
 
Two years previous, the DCMS watchdog QUEST had issued a strategy 
paper (to be used by funders and local authorities) called Making it Count. Its 
subtitle was "The Contribution of Culture and Sport to Social Inclusion" 
(DCMS 2002). As with Jowell's use of the term "impact", the real object of 
assessment for QUEST was "contribution". The challenge of cultural policies 
was not to generate powerful, meaningful, internationally influential art or 
culture so much as to define how art and culture related to (in a helpful way) 
other policy fields. 2002 was a significant year, insofar as urban policy began 
to wane as the most visible articulation of New Labour's politicisation of the 
public realm. Social policy was the new favoured flagship of innovation, and a 
lot of otherwise low-visibility policy work since 1999 began to emerge as 
significant for the arts. This included two key areas signified by two key 
documents — Arts and Neighborhood Renewal (DCMS, 1999a); and Local 
Cultural Strategies: Draft Guidance for Local Authorities in England (DCMS, 
1999b).  
 
The fate of urban policy and cultural policy was affected by a broad and 
complex innovation, influenced by various "neighborhood" projects in US 
cities. From 2000 New Labour (in part motivated by a philosophical flirtation 
with US Communitarianism) developed, through wide consultation, a National 
Strategy for Neighborhood Renewal. A Neighborhood Renewal Fund (the 
NRF) was one of many social funds that included the urban environment -- 
with funding categories like Decent Homes, Housing Market Renewal, New 
Deal for Communities (NDC), Excellence in Cities, and others. A Social 
Exclusion Unit (SEU) was convened to advise government strategy and no 
less than eighteen Policy Action Teams (PATS) gathered civil society actors 
to come up with radical solutions to neighborhood problems. It looked as if a 
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properly nuanced and critical understanding of the "social" could be more 
effective in informing urban policy development, than architects and planners. 
It was between 2000-2002 that a noticeable "social" turn in cultural policy 
could be detected, with local cultural strategies were employed by local 
authorities as strategic tools in broader local and social development. Cultural 
strategies were not compulsory, but many neighborhood and other vital funds 
(including admission to National Lottery funds) were only forthcoming if local 
authorities had implemented the cultural (and a number of other) strategic 
frameworks.  
 
From 2002, the principle aims of national cultural policy were not invested in 
ways of articulating the shape and dynamics of culture under increasing 
globalisation, migrations and diasporas, the rising force of religion and 
minority community authoritarianism, the rise of the creative industries and 
their central role in advertising and entertainment, or a huge range of other 
vital issues facing artists and cultural organisations and historical public 
culture. The principle aims were equally not the intra-communal development 
of artistic production, new artistic ideas, communication and the rising 
internet, or the role of culture in the public sphere. Rather, the principle aims 
of national cultural policy were a response to New Labour's increasing 
investment in the capacity of public management in maximising the use of arts 
and culture for addressing huge social issues identified in terms of "social 
inclusion", such as museum education for children, or arts outreach as a 
means of increasing the "participation" of the disabled or elderly, or audience 
development or marketing that targets ethnic minorities as a means of 
generating "diversity". Other social aims were now the responsibility of 
"cultural service providers" as the phrase was, where increased funding 
followed ever specified project schemes. At the time, the DCMS Social 
Inclusion Action Plan (2001) seemed innocuous and a welcome statement on 
the social relevance and social significance of culture. Yet it simply presaged 
a new political meta-framework of obligations for cultural policy, (as well as re-
stating the growing assumption that "the urban" was part of "the social", not 
the other way around). 
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The Local Government Act 2002 actually stated that the new local cultural 
strategies needed to become part of the (equally) new Community Plan (part 
of the neighbourhood spectrum of policies). At the national level (and this is 
something yet to be subject to scholarly analysis) arts policy and funding 
(such as Arts Council England) was becoming more a funding strategy body 
than simply an "enabling" champion of artistic culture. The difference was that 
a "strategic" body defined strategy (priorities and delivery) for its designated 
"sector" — thus assuming anyone in receipt of public funds were now directly 
working for national government policy priorities. Furthermore, a strategic 
funding body was itself under intensive monitoring scrutiny, and inexorably so, 
its funds were increasingly articulated so as to demonstrate it was meeting 
government social policy aims — not engaged in cultural sector capacity-
building or as catalyst of production). At the local level, like cities (whose 
funding powers, oddly, remained unconnected to national funding bodies like 
Arts Council England) cultural policy was a new unchartered territory, (and 
thus without suitably trained policy officers). Yet, as stated by the Guidance 
(2004), local authorities had to work "maximising the overlap between the 
work and outputs of community and cultural planning’ (DCMS/Creative 
Cultures, 2004:12). The Guidance (2004) also stated that "cultural planning" 
must not be entirely sunk into the "wider community development agenda". 
Yet, that was the very purpose of the local cultural strategy.  
 
Section Four: Auditing culture 
In 2002 when QUEST assessed the work of DCMS (highlighted in the 
Executive Summary of their report Making it Count), an interesting issue 
emerged: "the objectives of social inclusion work for the cultural and sporting 
sectors are not clear, partly because they have not yet been translated into 
cultural or sporting terms" (DCMS/QUEST, 2002: 2). The apparent failing in a 
“translation” of the social into cultural (and sporting) terms, was indeed 
symptomatic of a larger failure — to conceptualise culture itself as distinct 
(and autonomous from) the social, or any critical understanding on how 
"culture" has presented challenges with its integration into "society" or its 
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appeal to broad sectors of society who are seemingly uninterested or 
uninvolved. The QUEST comment also pointed out that very different 
concepts of culture were in circulation and use within key agencies (whether 
DCMS or local authorities) (DCMS/QUEST, 2002: passim). The emergence of 
differing concepts of culture coincided with the emergence of different 
categories of requirements on culture's social roles. The above cited 
Guidance (2004) defined culture as "an inclusive concept that embraces a 
wide variety of activities, places, values and beliefs that contribute to a sense 
of identity and well-being for everyone in our communities" (DCMS/Creative 
Cultures, 2004: 6), and despite this quasi-anthropological vagueness insisted 
on its specific usefulness in a multitude of specific social locations. These 
social locations, however, were heavily managed by professionals of fields 
other than cultural policy. 
The integration of culture with a social agenda and its spiraling series of policy 
initiatives generated some important opportunities for artists and the many 
beneficiaries. But no one agency of policy was invested in research to the 
extent that the necessary theoretical work could be accomplished and acted 
upon. In 2006, however, Arts Council England illustrated some of the 
opportunities that had emerged for artists — albeit, the artists themselves 
were barely mentioned. The priority of the colourful 2006, three-part report, 
was "impact": Called, The Power of Art: visual arts: evidence of impact (ACE, 
2006), the ‘urban’ was, again, just one of a broader social field of political 
challenges, with Health and Education the others.  
The aforementioned Neighbourhood Renewal national strategy (Cabinet 
Office, 2001) had not even mentioned arts and artists, despite its increasing 
breadth of named stakeholders (from universities to local business). But it did 
stimulate some good responses from cultural agencies, such as the London 
Arts’ Creative Neighborhoods scheme, targeting young people, racism and 
disadvantage in London' State housing areas (ACE, 2003b; Arts Council 
England initiated similar projects with Art in the Centre and Artists in the City 
projects). However, again, a lack of research and theoretical work mean that 
no genuine and sustainable field of socially-engaged arts emerged (absorbing 
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older activist forms of community arts and social art practices already in place, 
many emerging from the now booming field of Public art).  
By 2003, many if not most cultural organisations found themselves under an 
explicit political mandate, rhetorically framed in such a way that seemed to 
promote public culture, participation and social inclusion it could hardly be 
resisted. However, the political mandate required a return, and a range of 
mechanisms were demanded in obtaining data and other specific genres of 
information by which "evidence policy making" could be established. A 
government modernising government initiative, begun in 1999 (DETR, 1999c), 
had enrolled the government Treasury and all other agencies in obtaining a 
data return for any public funding (even routine or core funding to which an 
institution had a right by law). The Treasury had operated with a "white book" 
[guidelines for obligations to funded parties, including strict monitoring and 
reporting mechanisms] for some time, and in 2004 the DCMS devised its own 
White Book, establishing the practice for data submission and reporting for all 
cultural agencies or personnel in receipt of public funds (DCMS, 2004b).  
 
The emerging "audit culture" in the arts (Power, 1997; Gray, 2007) seemed to 
prompt the odd personal statement of the culture minister, Tessa Jowell, cited 
above, where her support for evidence-based policy making was put into 
question by a series of statements on the intrinsic value of culture. In 
Government and the Value of Culture, she insisted that public accountability 
— the very epicenter of democratic governance — was a "force" that 
politicians responded to by accounting for cultural expenditure in terms of "its 
instrumental benefits to other agendas". She lamenting the apparent lack of 
political ability to allow culture to be "for what it does in itself" (DCMS/Jowell, 
2004: 8), but the publication was written following a series of public speeches 
advocating "public debate" on value and culture.  
 
Yet, for all that, DCMS continued on its own quest to become a mainstream 
government ministry and respectable bureaucracy — not a political advocate 
for the value of culture. Its annual reviews bore no trace of Jowell’s initiated 
public debate; and where by 2007, huge political interventions had made 
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museums free of charge, promoted culture in schools, funded huge 
international touring, the digitization of many museum holdings (including the 
British Museum), policy statements remained fixated only on "evidence" 
defined activities and their social function.  
 
A good example is the Culture and Creativity report of 2007 (DCMS, 2007), 
which served to demonstrate the progress made by cultural policies since the 
election of New Labour in 1997. It featured no reference to advances in 
cultural research, cultural ideas, new technologies of cultural production and 
professional learning, and many other of the ways the arts were developing in 
2007. The progress made was articulated as polemic — funds well spent, the 
evidence for which was social access and visitor numbers (and by extension, 
volunteers, and new jobs or employment). Moreover, culture as a category, is 
itemised in terms of tangible benefit to individuals (even when an urban 
regeneration project is cited) — a form of social return on (public) investment. 
This approach to enumerating consumers, stakeholders, distribution and 
demand, employment and sectoral growth, was not fortuitous but demanded 
from Treasury de facto line management. What was demanded indeed 
seemed perfectly reasonable, and in the cause of an increase in public 
access and visitor numbers, public relevance and transparent expenditure of 
funds, the arts and cultural sectors transformed their practices of production 
 
Conclusion: Social Instrumentalism and populism  
 
The DCMS Culture and Creativity report of 2007 is significant is it portrays the 
basis of the arts and cultural sector as it largely stands today. National policy 
is defined in terms of "investment", and whose objects remain established 
organisations and events — along with the professionalisation of 
management and administration, increased data sets on visitors and 
audiences (and the increasing revenues they generate), and all explicitly 
benefitting a "public", where no substantive public is available (where the 
public has been de-politicised through its integration with the new "private" of 
national development partners). And despite an emphatic social policy 
framework acting a defining mechanism for culture’s strategic aims – no 
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substantive social achievements in applying cultural creativity to “society” was 
ever recorded (without denying the genuine impact of a range of single, small 
scale projects).   
Since 2004, politicians (most of them) and even policies have changed, but an 
historical intellectual-policy substrate still remains, and this can be defined in 
terms of social instrumentalism. The decisive shift away from urban policy as 
a principle mode of social transformation (and the potential for the arts within 
that) to a "neighbourhood" agenda, signified a significant repositioning for 
cultural policy outside a past political realm structured by a public-private 
dichotomy. The neighbourhood (not a term common to British policy) was an 
imported categorisation of an integration socio-urban environment, into which 
the arts and culture could be inserted according to social strategic targets 
(often to ameliorate the damage wrought by the “private” dimension of the 
public-private dynamics of development). This policy movement either 
absorbed, instrumentalised or marginalised other fields of social thought, such 
as community arts, arts therapy, public arts and rising strategies of artistic 
intervention.  
The perceived demands of democracy (at least, for the European Left since 
the 1980s) can be defined in terms of social inequity and the political de-
legitimation resulting from the social disenfranchisement of large segments of 
the traditional labouring class emerging from the deindustrialisation of the 
1970s. This article identified re-industrialisation as the principle political 
project that situated the arts and culture as valued participants in urban 
development and cities. The urban policy rhetoric of "renaissance" and 
"regeneration", of European origin, became persuasive as Britain's major 
cities became again centres of social and cultural change. As the commercial 
bent of the previous Conservative regime began to bear fruit in the 
increasingly gentrified and confused cityscape, New Labour offered the 
cultural sector a means of reversing this with explicit social aims but at the 
cost of a de facto partnership in the strategic management of the arts and 
cultural sector(s). (The use of the economics term "sector" was one rhetorical 
means by which the arts and culture were redefined both as creative 
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industries and in need of strategic management). The strategic management 
of culture was characterised by what I called a "vital contradiction". It was vital 
as the emergence of the free market was offering huge potential public funds 
as much as popularity with a consumer public, and the increasing complexity 
of multicultural Britain was spawning huge social divisions and alienation. It 
was a contradiction in that the cultural realm was compelled to participate in a 
project of social justice that threatened the very basis of its cultural autonomy, 
and asserted the State as manager and mediator of a newly constituted civil 
society realm of integrated public and private interests. And few resisted the 
imposition of a spectrum of detailed policy orders, reducing cultural value to 
social indicators, generating a new cultural executive (and largely uncreative) 
management over national cultural production, and a regime of monitoring 
and auditing whose psycho-social impacts were outside the scope of any 
research evaluation. 
 
Populism can emerge as one enterprise or internal to a policy field, where a 
government or party can stimulate the "popular" through an appeal to the 
assumed interests of the "public" as "mass" public, justify huge public 
expenditures, command obedience or engage in expulsion of party members 
for non-compliance. Populism can take the form of a political pragmatism of 
social conscience, seeking to reward the uneducated, the excluded, the 
marginalised majority of hard-working citizens. It can take the form of a 
complex social policy, yet charged with sentiment, emotion and accusations of 
injustice, and so evading all political deliberation or the procedural 
assessment formative for public policy. Populism, this article observes, can 
emerge as a spectrum of policy initiatives that appeal to the interests of 
national development — in critical resistance to the commercial values of the 
previous Conservative regime — and champion of “society”. Its 
uncompromising social agenda was at once undeniably warranted and yet 
which positioned the State as arbiter of national cultural production. Policy 
rhetoric convinced most that radical change was in the interests of "society", 
but where society and "the social" had been de-politicised and objectified as 
recipient of State patronage. Where State patronage took the form of huge 
rises in welfare and public funding, culture as public culture was easily 
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enfranchised as another function of State.   
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